WALLACE v. JAFFREE
JUSTICE STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court.
JUSTICE REHNQUIST, dissenting.
CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER, dissenting.
JUSTICE POWELL, concurring.
For the most part agreeing with the opinion
of THE CHIEF JUSTICE, I dissent from the Court's judgment invalidating
Ala. Code § 16-1-20.1 (Supp. 1984). Because I do, it is apparent
that in my view the First Amendment does not proscribe either
(1) statutes authorizing or requiring in so many words a moment
of silence before classes begin or (2) a statute that provides,
when it is initially passed, for a moment of silence for meditation
or prayer. As I read the filed opinions, a majority of the
Court would approve statutes that provided for a moment of silence
but did not mention prayer. But if a student asked whether he
could pray during that moment, it is difficult to believe that
the teacher could not answer in the affirmative. If that
is the case, I would not invalidate a statute that at the outset
provided the legislative answer to the question "May I pray?"
This is so even if the Alabama statute is infirm, which I do not
believe it is, because of its peculiar legislative history.
I appreciate JUSTICE REHNQUIST's explication
of the history of the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment.
Against that history, it would be quite understandable if we
undertook to reassess our cases dealing with these Clauses, particularly
those dealing with the Establishment Clause. Of course, I have
been out of step with many of the Court's decisions dealing with
this subject matter, and it is thus not surprising that I would
support a basic reconsideration of our precedents.
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