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MR. JUSTICE CLARK delivered the opinion of the Court.
MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, concurring.
MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, concurring.
MR. JUSTICE STEWART,
dissenting.
MR. JUSTICE GOLDBERG, with whom MR. JUSTICE
HARLAN joins, concurring.
As is apparent from the opinions filed today,
delineation of the constitutionally permissible relationship between
religion and government is a most difficult and sensitive task,
calling for the careful exercise of both judicial and public judgment
and restraint. The considerations which lead the Court today
to interdict the clearly religious practices presented in these
cases are to me wholly compelling; I have no doubt as to the propriety
of the decision and therefore join the opinion and judgment of
the Court. The singular sensitivity and concern which surround
both the legal and practical judgments involved impel me, however,
to add a few words in further explication, while at the same time
avoiding repetition of the carefully and ably framed examination
of history and authority by my Brethren.
The First Amendment's guarantees, as applied
to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, foreclose not
only laws "respecting an establishment of religion"
but also those "prohibiting the free exercise thereof."
These two proscriptions are to be read together, and in light
of the single end which they are designed to serve. The basic
purpose of the religion clause of the First Amendment is to promote
and assure the fullest possible scope of religious liberty and
tolerance for all and to nurture the conditions which secure the
best hope of attainment of that end.
The fullest realization of true religious
liberty requires that government neither engage in nor compel
religious practices, that it effect no favoritism among sects
or between religion and nonreligion, and that it work deterrence
of no religious belief. But devotion even to these simply stated
objectives presents no easy course, for the unavoidable accommodations
necessary to achieve the maximum enjoyment of each and
all of them are often difficult of discernment. There is for
me no simple and clear measure which by precise application can
readily and invariably demark the permissible from the impermissible.
It is said, and I agree, that the attitude
of government toward religion must be one of neutrality. But
untutored devotion to the concept of neutrality can lead to invocation
or approval of results which partake not simply of that noninterference
and noninvolvement with the religious which the Constitution commands,
but of a brooding and pervasive devotion to the secular and a
passive, or even active, hostility to the religious. Such results
are not only not compelled by the Constitution, but, it seems
to me, are prohibited by it.
Neither government nor this Court can or
should ignore the significance of the fact that a vast portion
of our people believe in and worship God and that many of our
legal, political and personal values derive historically from
religious teachings. Government must inevitably take cognizance
of the existence of religion and, indeed, under certain circumstances
the First Amendment may require that it do so. And it seems clear
to me from the opinions in the present and past cases that
the Court would recognize the propriety of providing military
chaplains and of the teaching about religion, as distinguished
from the teaching of religion, in the public schools. The examples
could readily be multiplied, for both the required and the permissible
accommodations between state and church frame the relation as
one free of hostility or favor and productive of religious and
political harmony, but without undue involvement of one in the
concerns or practices of the other. To be sure, the judgment
in each case is a delicate one, but it must be made if we are
to do loyal service as judges to the ultimate First Amendment
objective of religious liberty.
The practices here involved do not fall
within any sensible or acceptable concept of compelled or permitted
accommodation and involve the state so significantly and directly
in the realm of the sectarian as to give rise to those very divisive
influences and inhibitions of freedom which both religion clauses
of the First Amendment preclude. The state has ordained and has
utilized its facilities to engage in unmistakably religious exercises
-- the devotional reading and recitation of the Holy Bible
-- in a manner having substantial and significant import and impact.
That it has selected, rather than written, a particular devotional
liturgy seems to me without constitutional import. The pervasive
religiosity and direct governmental involvement inhering in the
prescription of prayer and Bible reading in the public schools,
during and as part of the curricular day, involving young impressionable
children whose school attendance is statutorily compelled, and
utilizing the prestige, power, and influence of school administration,
staff, and authority, cannot realistically be termed simply accommodation,
and must fall within the interdiction of the First Amendment.
I find nothing in the opinion of the Court which says more than
this. And, of course, today's decision does not mean that all
incidents of government which import of the religious are therefore
and without more banned by the strictures of the Establishment
Clause. As the Court declared only last Term in Engel v. Vitale,
370 U.S. 421, 435, n. 21:
"There is of course nothing in the decision reached here that is inconsistent with the fact that school children and others are officially encouraged to express love for our country by reciting historical documents such as the Declaration of Independence which contain references to the Deity or by singing officially espoused anthems which include the composer's professions of faith in a Supreme Being, or with the fact that there are many manifestations in our public life of belief in God. Such patriotic or ceremonial occasions bear no true resemblance to the unquestioned religious exercise that the State . . . has sponsored in this instance."
The First Amendment does not prohibit practices
which by any realistic measure create none of the dangers which
it is designed to prevent and which do not so directly or substantially
involve the state in religious exercises or in the favoring of
religion as to have meaningful and practical impact. It is of
course true that great consequences can grow from small beginnings,
but the measure of constitutional adjudication is the ability
and willingness to distinguish between real threat and mere shadow.
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