Chicago, M. & St. P. R.R. v. Minn.: Mr. Justice Bradley dissenting

MR. JUSTICE BRADLEY joined by JUSTICE GRAY and JUSTICE LAMAR dissenting.

Chicago, M. & St. P. R.R. v. Minn.

MR. JUSTICE BLATCHFORD delivered the opinion of the court.

Justice Miller concurring in a separate opinion.

MR. JUSTICE BRADLEY joined by MR. JUSTICE GRAY and MR. JUSTICE LAMAR dissenting.

I cannot agree to the decision of the court in this case. It practically overrules Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, and the several railroad cases that were decided at the same time. The governing principle of those cases was that the regulation and settlement of the fares of railroads and other public accommodations is a legislative prerogative and not a judicial one. This is a principle which I regard as of great importance. When a railroad company is chartered, it is for the purpose of performing a duty which belongs to the State itself. It is chartered as an agent of the State for furnishing public accommodation. The State might build its railroads if it saw fit. It is its duty and its prerogative to provide means of intercommunication between one part of its territory and another. And this duty is devolved upon the legislative department. If the legislature commissions private parties, whether corporations or individuals, to perform this duty, it is its prerogative to fix the fares and freights which they may charge for their services. When merely a road or a canal is to be constructed, it is for the legislature to fix the tolls to be paid by those who use it; when a company is chartered not only to build a road, but to carry on public transportation upon it, it is for the legislature to fix the charges for such transportation.

But it is said that all charges should be reasonable, and that none but reasonable charges can be exacted; and it is urged that what is a reasonable charge is a judicial question. On the contrary, it is preeminently a legislative one, involving considerations of policy as well as of remuneration; and is usually determined by the legisalture, by fixing a maximum of charges in the charter of the company, or afterwards, if its hands are not tied by contract. If this maximum is not exceeded, the courts cannot interfere. When the rates are not thus determined, they are left to the discretion of the company, subject to the express or implied condition that they shall be reasonable; express, when so declared by statute; implied, by the common law, when the statute is silent; and the common law has effect by virtue of the legislative will.

Thus, the legislature either fixes the charges at rates which it deems reasonable; or merely declares that they shall be reasonable; and it is only in the latter case, where what is reasonable is left open, that the courts have jurisdiction of the subject. I repeat: When the legislature declares that the charges shall be reasonable, or, which is the same thing, allows the common law rule to that effect to prevail, and leaves the matter there; then resort may be had to the courts to inquire judicially whether the charges are reasonable. Then, and not till then, is it a judicial question. But the legislature has the right, and it is its prerogative, if it chooses to exercise it, to declare what is reasonable.

This is just where I differ from the majority of the court. They say in effect, if not in terms, that the final tribunal of arbitrament is the judiciary; I say it is the legislature. I hold that it is a legislative question, not a judicial one, unless the legislature or the law, (which is the same thing,) has made it judicial, by prescribing the rule that the charges shall be reasonable, and leaving it there.

It is always a delicate thing for the courts to make an issue with the legislative department of the government, and they should never do so if it is possible to avoid it. By the decision now made we declare, in effect, that the judiciary, and not the legislature, is the final arbiter in the regulation of fares and freights of railroads and the charges of other public accommodations. It is an assumption of authority on the part of the judiciary which, it seems to me, with all due deference to the judgment of my brethren, it has no right to make. The assertion of jurisdiction by this court makes it the duty of every court of general jurisdiction, state or federal, to entertain complaints against the decisions of the boards of commissioners appointed by the States to regulate their railroads; for all courts are bound by the Constitution of the United States, the same as we are. Our jurisdiction is merely appellate.

The incongruity of this position will appear more distinctly by a reference to the nature of the cases under consideration. The question presented before the commission in each case was one relating simply to the reasonableness of the rates charged by the companies, -- a question of more or less. In the one case the company charged three cents per gallon for carrying milk between certain points. The commission deemed this to be unreasonable, and reduced the charge to 2 1/2 cents. In the other case the company charged $1.25 per car for handling and switching empty cars over its lines within the city of Minneapolis, and $1.50 for loaded cars; and the commission decided that $1.00 per car was a sufficient charge in all cases. The companies complain that the charges as fixed by the commission are unreasonably low and that they are deprived of their property without due process of law; that they are entitled to a trial by a court and jury, and are not barred by the decisions of a legislative commission. The state court held that the legislature had the right to establish such a commission, and that its determinations are binding and final, and that the courts cannot review them. This court now reverses that decision, and holds the contrary. In my judgment the state court was right, and the establishment of the commission, and its proceedings, were no violation of the constitutional prohibition against depriving persons of their property without due process of law.

I think it is perfectly clear, and well settled by the decisions of this court, that the legislature might have fixed the rates in question. If it had done so, it would have done it through the aid of committees appointed to investigate the subject, to acquire information, to cite parties, to get all the facts before them, and finally to decide and report. No one could have said that this was not due process of law. And if the legislature itself could do this, acting by its committees, and proceeding according to the usual forms adopted by such bodies, I can see no good reason why it might not delegate the duty to a board of commissioners, charged, as the board in this case was, to regulate and fix the charges, so as to be equal and reasonable. Such a board would have at its command all the means of getting at the truth and ascertaining the reasonableness of fares and freights, which a legislative committee has. It might, or it might not, swear witnesses and examine parties. Its duties being of an administrative character, it would have the widest scope for examination and inquiry. All means of knowledge and information would be at its command, -- just as they would be at the command of the legislature which created it. Such a body, though not a court, is a proper tribunal for the duties imposed upon it.

In the case of Davidson v. City of New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97, we decided that the appointment of a board of assessors for assessing damages was not only due process of law, but the proper method for making assessments to distribute the burden of a public work amongst those who are benefited by it. No one questions the constitutionality or propriety of boards for assessing property for taxation, or for the improvement of streets, sewers and the like, or of commissions to establish county seats, and for doing many other things appertaining to the administrative management of public affairs. Due process of law does not always require a court. It merely requires such tribunals and proceedings as are proper to the subject in hand. In the Railroad Commission Cases, 116 U.S. 307, we held that a boar of commissioners is a proper tribunal for determining the proper rates of fare and freight on the railroads of a state. It seems to me, therefore, that the law of Minnesota did not prescribe anything that was not in accordance with due process of alw in creating such a board, and investing it with the powers in question.

It is complained that the decisions of the board are final and without appeal. So are the decisions of the courts in matters within their jurisdiction. There must be a final tribunal somewhere for deciding every question in the world. Injustice may take place in all tribunals. All human institutions are imperfect -- courts as well as commissions and legislatures. Whatever tribunal has jurisdiction, its decisions are final and conclusive unless an appeal is given therefrom. The important question always is, what is the lawful tribunal for the particular case? In my judgment, in the present case, the proper tribunal was the legislature, or the board of commissioners which it created for the purpose.

If not in terms, yet in effect, the present cases are treated as if the constitutional prohibition was, that no state shall take private property for public use without just compensation, -- and as if it was our duty to judge of the compensation. But there is no such clause in the constitution of the United States. The Fifth Amendment is prohibitory upon the federal government only, and not upon the state governments. In this matter, -- just compensation for property taken for public use, -- the states make their own regulations, by constitution, or otherwise. They are only required by the federal Constitution to provide "due process of law." It was alleged in Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97, that the property assessed was not benefited by the improvement; but we held that that was a matter with which we would not interfere; the question was, whether there was due process of law. p. 106. If a state court renders an unjust judgment, we cannot remedy it.

I do not mean to say that the legislature, or its constituted board of commissioners, or other legislative agency, may not so act as to deprive parties of their property without due process of law. The Constitution contemplates the possibility of such an invasion of rights. But, acting within their jurisdiction, (as in these cases they have done,) the invasion should be clear and unmistakable to bring the case within that category. Nothing of the kind exists in the cases before us. The legislature, in establishing the commission, did not exceed its power; and the commission, in acting upon the cases, did not exceed its jurisdiction, and was not chargeable with fraudulent behavior. There was merely a difference of judgment as to amount, between the commission and the companies, without any indication of intent on the part of the former to do injustice. The board may have erred; but if they did, as the matter was within their rightful jurisdiction, their decision was final and conclusive unless their proceedings could be impeached for fraud. Deprivation of property by mere arbitrary power on the part of the legislature, or fraud on the part of the commission, are the only grounds on which judicial relief may be sought against their action. There was, in truth, no deprivation of property in these cases at all. There was merely a regulation as to the enjoyment of property, made by a strictly competent authority, in a matter entirely within its jurisdiction.

It may be that our legislatures are invested with too much power, open, as they are, to influences so dangerous to the interests of individuals, corporations and society. But such is the Constitution of our republican form of government; and we are bound to abide by it until it can be corrected in a legitimate way. If our legislatures become too arbitrary in the exercise of their powers, the people always have a remedy in their hands; they may at any time restrain them by constitutional limitations. But so long as they remain invested with the powers that ordinarily belong to the legislative branch of government, they are entitled to exercise those powers, amongst which, in my judgment, is that of the regulation of railroads and other public means of intercommunication, and the burdens and charges which those who own them are authorized to impose upon the public.

I am authorized to say that Mr. Justice Gray and Mr. Justice Lamar agree with me in this dissenting opinion.