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MR. JUSTICE GOLDBERG delivered the opinion of the Court.
MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, dissenting.
MR. JUSTICE WHITE,
with whom MR. JUSTICE CLARK and MR. JUSTICE STEWART join, dissenting.
I think this case is directly controlled by
Cicenia v. Lagay, 357 U.S. 504, and I would therefore affirm the
judgment.
Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, is
not in point here. In that case a federal grand jury had indicted
Massiah. He had retained a lawyer and entered a formal plea of
not guilty. Under our system of federal justice an indictment
and arraignment are followed by a trial, at which the Sixth Amendment
guarantees the defendant the assistance of counsel. 1
But Massiah was released on bail, and thereafter agents of the
Federal Government deliberately elicited incriminating statements
from him in the absence of his lawyer. We held that the use of
these statements against him at his trial denied him the basic
protections of the Sixth Amendment guarantee. Putting to one side
the fact that the case now before us is not a federal case, the
vital fact remains that this case does not involve the deliberate
interrogation of a defendant after the initiation of judicial
proceedings against him. The Court disregards this basic difference
between the present case and Massiah's, with the bland assertion
that "that fact should make no difference." Ante, p.
485.
It is "that fact," I submit, which
makes all the difference. Under our system of criminal justice
the institution of formal, meaningful judicial proceedings, by
way of indictment, information, or arraignment, marks the point
at which a criminal investigation has ended and adversary proceedings
have commenced. It is at this point that the constitutional guarantees
attach which pertain to a criminal trial. Among those guarantees
are the right to a speedy trial, the right of confrontation, and
the right to trial by jury. Another is the guarantee of the assistance
of counsel. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335; Hamilton v. Alabama,
368 U.S. 52; White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59.
The confession which the Court today holds
inadmissible was a voluntary one. It was given during the course
of a perfectly legitimate police investigation of an unsolved
murder. The Court says that what happened during this investigation
"affected" the trial. I had always supposed that the
whole purpose of a police investigation of a murder was to "affect"
the trial of the murderer, and that it would be only an incompetent,
unsuccessful, or corrupt investigation which would not do so.
The Court further says that the Illinois police officers did not
advise the petitioner of his "constitutional rights"
before he confessed to the murder. This Court has never held that
the Constitution requires the police to give any "advice"
under circumstances such as these.
Supported by no stronger authority than its
own rhetoric, the Court today converts a routine police investigation
of an unsolved murder into a distorted analogue of a judicial
trial. It imports into this investigation constitutional concepts
historically applicable only after the onset of formal prosecutorial
proceedings. By doing so, I think the Court perverts those precious
constitutional guarantees, and frustrates the vital interests
of society in preserving the legitimate and proper function of
honest and purposeful police investigation.
Like my Brother CLARK, I cannot escape the
logic of my Brother WHITE's conclusions as to the extraordinary
implications which emanate from the Court's opinion in this case,
and I share their views as to the untold and highly unfortunate
impact today's decision may have upon the fair administration
of criminal justice. I can only hope we have completely misunderstood
what the Court has said.
---- Begin EndNotes ----
1 "In
all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right .
. . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence."
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