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JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court.
JUSTICE BRENNAN, with whom JUSTICE MARSHALL joins, concurring in part and dissenting in part.
JUSTICE BLACKMUN, concurring in the judgment.
JUSTICE POWELL, with whom JUSTICE O'CONNOR
joins, concurring.
JUSTICE STEVENS, with whom JUSTICE MARSHALL joins, and with whom
JUSTICE BRENNAN joins as to Part I, concurring in part and dissenting
in part.
Assistant Vice Principal Choplick searched T. L. O.'s purse for
evidence that she was smoking in the girls' restroom. Because
T. L. O.'s suspected misconduct was not illegal and did not pose
a serious threat to school discipline, the New Jersey Supreme
Court held that Choplick's search of her purse was an unreasonable
invasion of her privacy and that the evidence which he seized
could not be used against her in criminal proceedings. The New
Jersey court's holding was a careful response to the case it was
required to decide.
The State of New Jersey sought review in this Court, first arguing
that the exclusionary rule is wholly inapplicable to searches
conducted by school officials, and then contending that the Fourth
Amendment itself provides no protection at all to the student's
privacy. The Court has accepted neither of these frontal assaults
on the Fourth Amendment. It has, however, seized upon this "no
smoking" case to announce "the proper standard"
that should govern searches by school officials who are confronted
with disciplinary problems far more severe than smoking in the
restroom. Although I join Part II of the Court's opinion, I continue
to believe that the Court has unnecessarily and inappropriately
reached out to decide a constitutional question. See 468 U.S.
1214 (1984) (STEVENS, J., dissenting from reargument order). More
importantly, I fear that the concerns that motivated the Court's
activism have produced a holding that will permit school administrators
to search students suspected of violating only the most trivial
school regulations and guidelines for behavior.
I
The question the Court decides today -- whether Mr. Choplick's
search of T. L. O.'s purse violated the Fourth Amendment -- was
not raised by the State's petition for writ of certiorari. That
petition only raised one question: "Whether the Fourth Amendment's
exclusionary rule applies to searches made by public school officials
and teachers in school." 1
The State quite properly declined to submit the former question
because "[it] did not wish to present what might appear to
be solely a factual dispute to this Court." 2
Since this Court has twice had the threshold question argued,
I believe that it should expressly consider the merits of the
New Jersey Supreme Court's ruling that the exclusionary rule applies.
The New Jersey Supreme Court's holding on this question is plainly
correct. As the state court noted, this case does not involve
the use of evidence in a school disciplinary proceeding; the juvenile
proceedings brought against T. L. O. involved a charge that would
have been a criminal offense if committed by an adult. 3
Accordingly, the exclusionary rule issue Decided by that court
and later presented to this Court concerned only the use in a
criminal proceeding of evidence obtained in a search conducted
by a public school administrator.
Having confined the issue to the law enforcement context, the
New Jersey court then reasoned that this Court's cases have made
it quite clear that the exclusionary rule is equally applicable
"whether the public official who illegally obtained the evidence
was a municipal inspector, See v. Seattle 387 U.S. 541 [1967];
Camara [v. Municipal Court,] 387 U.S. 523 [1967]; a firefighter,
Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 506 [1978]; or a school administrator
or law enforcement official." 4
It correctly concluded "that if an official search violates
constitutional rights, the evidence is not admissible in criminal
proceedings." 5
When a defendant in a criminal proceeding alleges that she was
the victim of an illegal search by a school administrator, the
application of the exclusionary rule is a simple corollary of
the principle that "all evidence obtained by searches and
seizures in violation of the Constitution is, by that same authority,
inadmissible in a state court." Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643,
655 (1961). The practical basis for this principle is, in part,
its deterrent effect, see id., at 656, and as a general matter
it is tolerably clear to me, as it has been to the Court, that
the existence of an exclusionary remedy does deter the authorities
from violating the Fourth Amendment by sharply reducing their
incentive to do so. 6 In the
case of evidence obtained in school searches, the "overall
educative effect" 7 of
the exclusionary rule adds important symbolic force to this utilitarian
judgment.
Justice Brandeis was both a great student and a great teacher.
It was he who wrote:
"Our Government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the whole people by its example. Crime is contagious. If the Government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy." Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (dissenting opinion).
Those of us who revere the flag and the ideals for which it stands
believe in the power of symbols. We cannot ignore that rules of
law also have a symbolic power that may vastly exceed their utility.
Schools are places where we inculcate the values essential to
the meaningful exercise of rights and responsibilities by a self-governing
citizenry. 8 If the Nation's
students can be convicted through the use of arbitrary methods
destructive of personal liberty, they cannot help but feel that
they have been dealt with unfairly. 9
The application of the exclusionary rule in criminal proceedings
arising from illegal school searches makes an important statement
to young people that "our society attaches serious consequences
to a violation of constitutional rights," 10
and that this is a principle of "liberty and justice for
all." 11
Thus, the simple and correct answer to the question presented
by the State's petition for certiorari would have required affirmance
of a state court's judgment suppressing evidence. That result
would have been dramatically out of character for a Court that
not only grants prosecutors relief from suppression orders with
distressing regularity, 12
but also is prone to rely on grounds not advanced by the parties
in order to protect evidence from exclusion. 13
In characteristic disregard of the doctrine of judicial restraint,
the Court avoided that result in this case by ordering reargument
and directing the parties to address a constitutional question
that the parties, with good reason, had not asked the Court to
decide. Because judicial activism undermines the Court's power
to perform its central mission in a legitimate way, I dissented
from the reargument order. See 468 U.S. 1214 (1984). I have not
modified the views expressed in that dissent, but since the majority
has brought the question before us, I shall explain why I believe
the Court has misapplied the standard of reasonableness embodied
in the Fourth Amendment.
II
The search of a young woman's purse by a school administrator
is a serious invasion of her legitimate expectations of privacy.
A purse "is a common repository for one's personal effects
and therefore is inevitably associated with the expectation of
privacy." Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 762 (1979).
Although such expectations must sometimes yield to the legitimate
requirements of government, in assessing the constitutionality
of a warrantless search, our decision must be guided by the language
of the Fourth Amendment: "The right of the people to be secure
in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated. . . ." In order
to evaluate the reasonableness of such searches, "it is necessary
'first to focus upon the governmental interest which allegedly
justifies official intrusion upon the constitutionally protected
interests of the private citizen,' for there is 'no ready test
for determining reasonableness other than by balancing the need
to search [or seize] against the invasion which the search [or
seizure] entails.'" Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1968)
(quoting Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528, 534-537,
(1967)). 14
The "limited search for weapons" in Terry was justified
by the "immediate interest of the police officer in taking
steps to assure himself that the person with whom he is dealing
is not armed with a weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally
be used against him." 392 U.S., at 23, 25. When viewed from
the institutional perspective, "the substantial need of teachers
and administrators for freedom to maintain order in the schools,"
ante, at 341 (majority opinion), is no less acute. Violent, unlawful,
or seriously disruptive conduct is fundamentally inconsistent
with the principal function of teaching institutions which is
to educate young people and prepare them for citizenship. 15
When such conduct occurs amidst a sizable group of impressionable
young people, it creates an explosive atmosphere that requires
a prompt and effective response.
Thus, warrantless searches of students by school administrators
are reasonable when undertaken for those purposes. But the majority's
statement of the standard for evaluating the reasonableness of
such searches is not suitably adapted to that end. The majority
holds that "a search of a student by a teacher or other school
official will be 'justified at its inception' when there are reasonable
grounds for suspecting that the search will turn up evidence that
the student has violated or is violating either the law or the
rules of the school." Ante, at 341-342. This standard will
permit teachers and school administrators to search students when
they suspect that the search will reveal evidence of even the
most trivial school regulation or precatory guideline for student
behavior. The Court's standard for deciding whether a search is
justified "at its inception" treats all violations of
the rules of the school as though they were fungible. For the
Court, a search for curlers and sunglasses in order to enforce
the school dress code 16
is apparently just as important as a search for evidence of heroin
addiction or violent gang activity.
The majority, however, does not contend that school administrators
have a compelling need to search students in order to achieve
optimum enforcement of minor school regulations. 17
To the contrary, when minor violations are involved, there is
every indication that the informal school disciplinary process,
with only minimum requirements of due process, 18
can function effectively without the power to search for enough
evidence to prove a criminal case. In arguing that teachers and
school administrators need the power to search students based
on a lessened standard, the United States as amicus curiae relies
heavily on empirical evidence of a contemporary crisis of violence
and unlawful behavior that is seriously undermining the process
of education in American schools. 19
A standard better attuned to this concern would permit teachers
and school administrators to search a student when they have reason
to believe that the search will uncover evidence that the student
is violating the law or engaging in conduct that is seriously
disruptive of school order, or the educational process.
This standard is properly directed at "[the] sole justification
for the [warrantless] search." 20
In addition, a standard that varies the extent of the permissible
intrusion with the gravity of the suspected offense is also more
consistent with common-law experience and this Court's precedent.
Criminal law has traditionally recognized a distinction between
essentially regulatory offenses and serious violations of the
peace, and graduated the response of the criminal justice system
depending on the character of the violation. 21
The application of a similar distinction in evaluating the reasonableness
of warrantless searches and seizures "is not a novel idea."
Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 750 (1984). 22
In Welsh, police officers arrived at the scene of a traffic accident
and obtained information indicating that the driver of the automobile
involved was guilty of a first offense of driving while intoxicated
-- a civil violation with a maximum fine of $ 200. The driver
had left the scene of the accident, and the officers followed
the suspect to his home where they arrested him without a warrant.
Absent exigent circumstances, the warrantless invasion of the
home was a clear violation of Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573
(1980). In holding that the warrantless arrest for the "noncriminal,
traffic offense" in Welsh was unconstitutional, the Court
noted that "application of the exigent-circumstances exception
in the context of a home entry should rarely be sanctioned when
there is probable cause to believe that only a minor offense .
. . has been committed." 466 U.S., at 753.
The logic of distinguishing between minor and serious offenses
in evaluating the reasonableness of school searches is almost
too clear for argument. In order to justify the serious intrusion
on the persons and privacy of young people that New Jersey asks
this Court to approve, the State must identify "some real
immediate and serious consequences." McDonald v. United States,
335 U.S. 451, 460 (1948) (Jackson, J., concurring, joined by Frankfurter,
J.). 23 While school administrators
have entirely legitimate reasons for adopting school regulations
and guidelines for student behavior, the authorization of searches
to enforce them "displays a shocking lack of all sense of
proportion." Id., 459. 24
The majority offers weak deference to these principles of balance
and decency by announcing that school searches will only be reasonable
in scope "when the measures adopted are reasonably related
to the objectives of the search and not excessively intrusive
in light of the age and sex of the student and the nature of the
infraction." Ante, at 342 (emphasis added). The majority
offers no explanation why a two-part standard is necessary to
evaluate the reasonableness of the ordinary school search. Significantly,
in the balance of its opinion the Court pretermits any discussion
of the nature of T. L. O.'s infraction of the "no smoking"
rule.
The "rider" to the Court's standard for evaluating the
reasonableness of the initial intrusion apparently is the Court's
perception that its standard is overly generous and does not,
by itself, achieve a fair balance between the administrator's
right to search and the student's reasonable expectations of privacy.
The Court's standard for evaluating the "scope" of reasonable
school searches is obviously designed to prohibit physically intrusive
searches of students by persons of the opposite sex for relatively
minor offenses. The Court's effort to establish a standard that
is, at once, clear enough to allow searches to be upheld in nearly
every case, and flexible enough to prohibit obviously unreasonable
intrusions of young adults' privacy only creates uncertainty in
the extent of its resolve to prohibit the latter. Moreover, the
majority's application of its standard in this case -- to permit
a male administrator to rummage through the purse of a female
high school student in order to obtain evidence that she was smoking
in a bathroom -- raises grave doubts in my mind whether its effort
will be effective. 25 Unlike
the Court, I believe the nature of the suspected infraction is
a matter of first importance in deciding whether any invasion
of privacy is permissible.
III
The Court embraces the standard applied by the New Jersey Supreme
Court as equivalent to its own, and then deprecates the state
court's application of the standard as reflecting "a somewhat
crabbed notion of reasonableness." Ante, at 343. There is
no mystery, however, in the state court's finding that the search
in this case was unconstitutional; the decision below was not
based on a manipulation of reasonable suspicion, but on the trivial
character of the activity that promoted the official search. The
New Jersey Supreme Court wrote:
"We are satisfied that when a school official has reasonable
grounds to believe that a student possesses evidence of illegal
activity or activity that would interfere with school discipline
and order, the school official has the right to conduct a reasonable
search for such evidence.
"In determining whether the school official has reasonable
grounds, courts should consider 'the child's age, history, and
school record, the prevalence and seriousness of the problem in
the school to which the search was directed, the exigency to make
the search without delay, and the probative value and reliability
of the information used as a justification for the search.'"
26
The emphasized language in the state court's opinion focuses on
the character of the rule infraction that is to be the object
of the search.
In the view of the state court, there is a quite obvious and material
difference between a search for evidence relating to violent or
disruptive activity, and a search for evidence of a smoking rule
violation. This distinction does not imply that a no-smoking rule
is a matter of minor importance. Rather, like a rule that prohibits
a student from being tardy, its occasional violation in a context
that poses no threat of disrupting school order and discipline
offers no reason to believe that an immediate search is necessary
to avoid unlawful conduct, violence, or a serious impairment of
the educational process.
A correct understanding of the New Jersey court's standard explains
why that court concluded in T. L. O.'s case that "the assistant
principal did not have reasonable grounds to believe that the
student was concealing in her purse evidence of criminal activity
or evidence of activity that would seriously interfere with school
discipline or order." 27
The importance of the nature of the rule infraction to the New
Jersey Supreme Court's holding is evident from its brief explanation
of the principal basis for its decision:
"A student has an expectation of privacy in the contents of her purse. Mere possession of cigarettes did not violate school rule or policy, since the school allowed smoking in designated areas. The contents of the handbag had no direct bearing on the infraction.
"The assistant principal's desire, legal in itself, to gather evidence to impeach the student's credibility at a hearing on the disciplinary infraction does not validate the search." 28
Like the New Jersey Supreme Court, I would view this case differently
if the Assistant Vice Principal had reason to believe T. L. O.'s
purse contained evidence of criminal activity, or of an activity
that would seriously disrupt school discipline. There was, however,
absolutely no basis for any such assumption -- not even a "hunch."
In this case, Mr. Choplick overreacted to what appeared to be
nothing more than a minor infraction -- a rule prohibiting smoking
in the bathroom of the freshmen's and sophomores' building. 29
It is, of course, true that he actually found evidence of serious
wrongdoing by T. L. O., but no one claims that the prior search
may be justified by his unexpected discovery. As far as the smoking
infraction is concerned, the search for cigarettes merely tended
to corroborate a teacher's eyewitness account of T. L. O.'s violation
of a minor regulation designed to channel student smoking behavior
into designated locations. Because this conduct was neither unlawful
nor significantly disruptive of school order or the educational
process, the invasion of privacy associated with the forcible
opening of T. L. O.'s purse was entirely unjustified at its inception.
A review of the sampling of school search cases relied on by the
Court demonstrates how different this case is from those in which
there was indeed a valid justification for intruding on a student's
privacy. In most of them the student was suspected of a criminal
violation; 30 in the remainder
either violence or substantial disruption of school order or the
integrity of the academic process was at stake. 31
Few involved matters as trivial as the no-smoking rule violated
by T. L. O. 32 The rule the
Court adopts today is so open-ended that it may make the Fourth
Amendment virtually meaningless in the school context. Although
I agree that school administrators must have broad latitude to
maintain order and discipline in our classrooms, that authority
is not unlimited.
IV
The schoolroom is the first opportunity most citizens have to
experience the power of government. Through it passes every citizen
and public official, from schoolteachers to policemen and prison
guards. The values they learn there, they take with them in life.
One of our most cherished ideals is the one contained in the Fourth
Amendment: that the government may not intrude on the personal
privacy of its citizens without a warrant or compelling circumstance.
The Court's decision today is a curious moral for the Nation's
youth. Although the search of T. L. O.'s purse does not trouble
today's majority, I submit that we are not dealing with "matters
relatively trivial to the welfare of the Nation. There are village
tyrants as well as village Hampdens, but none who acts under color
of law is beyond reach of the Constitution." West Virginia
State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943).
I respectfully dissent.
---- Begin EndNotes ----
1 Pet. for Cert. i.
2 Supplemental Brief for Petitioner
6.
3 State ex rel. T. L. O., 94
N. J. 331, 337, nn. 1 and 2, 342, n. 5, 463 A. 2d 934, 937, nn.
1 and 2, 939, n. 5 (1983).
4 Id., at 341, 463 A. 2d, at
939.
5 Id., at 341-342, 463 A. 2d,
at 939.
6 See, e. g., Stone v. Powell,
428 U.S. 465, 492 (1976); United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433,
453 (1976); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347-348 (1974);
Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174-175 (1969).
7 Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S.,
at 493.
8 See Board of Education v.
Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 864-865 (1982) (BRENNAN, J., joined by MARSHALL
and STEVENS, JJ.); id., at 876, 880 (BLACKMUN, J., concurring
in part and concurring in judgment); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202,
221 (1982); Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 76 (1979); Tinker
v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503,
507, 511-513 (1969); Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483,
493 (1954); West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette,
319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943).
9 Cf. In re Gault, 387 U.S.
1, 26-27 (1967). JUSTICE BRENNAN has written of an analogous case:
"We do not know what class petitioner was attending when
the police and dogs burst in, but the lesson the school authorities
taught her that day will undoubtedly make a greater impression
than the one her teacher had hoped to convey. I would grant certiorari
to teach petitioner another lesson: that the Fourth Amendment
protects '[the] right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures'. . . . Schools cannot expect their students to learn
the lessons of good citizenship when the school authorities themselves
disregard the fundamental principles underpinning our constitutional
freedoms." Doe v. Renfrow, 451 U.S. 1022, 1027-1028 (1981)
(dissenting from denial of certiorari).
10 Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S.,
at 492.
11 36 U. S. C. § 172
(pledge of allegiance to the flag).
12 A brief review of the
Fourth Amendment cases involving criminal prosecutions since the
October Term, 1982, supports the proposition. Compare Florida
v. Rodriguez, ante, p. 1 (per curiam); United States v. Leon,
468 U.S. 897 (1984); Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981 (1984);
Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796 (1984); United States v.
Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984); Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170
(1984); United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109 (1984); Massachusetts
v. Upton, 466 U.S. 727 (1984) (per curiam); Florida v. Meyers,
466 U.S. 380 (1984) (per curiam); Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032
(1983); Illinois v. Andreas, 463 U.S. 765 (1983); Illinois v.
Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640 (1983); United States v. Villamonte-Marquez,
462 U.S. 579 (1983); Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983); Texas
v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730 (1983); United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S.
276 (1983); Illinois v. Batchelder, 463 U.S. 1112 (1983) (per
curiam); Cardwell v. Taylor, 461 U.S. 571 (1983) (per curiam),
with Thompson v. Louisiana, ante, p. 17 (per curiam); Welsh v.
Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740 (1984); Michigan v. Clifford, 464 U.S.
287 (1984); United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983); Florida
v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983).
13 E. g. United States v. Karo, 468 U.S., at 719-721; see also Segura v. United States, 468 U.S., at 805-813 (opinion of BURGER, C. J., joined by O'CONNOR, J.); cf. Illinois v. Gates, 459 U.S. 1028 (1982) (STEVENS, J., dissenting from reargument order, joined by BRENNAN and MARSHALL, JJ.)
422 U.S. 873, 881-882 (1975); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte,
428 U.S. 543, 567 (1976).
14 Cf. ante, at 353 (BLACKMUN,
J., concurring in judgment) ("The special need for an immediate
response to behavior that threatens either the safety of schoolchildren
and teachers or the educational process itself justifies the Court
in excepting school searches from the warrant and probable-cause
requirement"); ante, at 350 (POWELL, J., concurring, joined
by O'CONNOR, J.) ("Without first establishing discipline
and maintaining order, teachers cannot begin to educate their
students").
15 Parent-Student Handbook of Piscataway [N. J.] H. S. (1979), Record Doc. S-1, p. 7. A brief survey of school rule books reveals that, under the majority's approach, teachers and school administrators may also search students to enforce school rules regulating:
(i) secret societies;
(ii) students driving to school;
(iii) parking and use of parking lots during school hours;
(iv) smoking on campus;
(v) the direction of traffic in the hallways;
(vi) student presence in the hallways during class hours without
a pass;
(vii) profanity;
(viii) school attendance of interscholastic athletes on the day
of a game, meet or match;
(ix) cafeteria use and cleanup;
(x) eating lunch off-campus; and
(xi) unauthorized absence.
See id., at 7-18; Student Handbook of South Windsor [Conn.] H.
S. (1984); Fairfax County [Va.] Public Schools, Student Responsibilities
and Rights (1980); Student Handbook of Chantilly [Va.] H. S. (1984).
16 Cf. Camara v. Municipal
Court, 387 U.S. 523, 535-536 (1967) ("There is unanimous
agreement among those most familiar with this field that the only
effective way to seek universal compliance with the minimum standards
required by municipal codes is through routine periodic inspections
of all structures. . . . [If] the probable cause standard . .
. is adopted, . . . the reasonable goals of code enforcement will
be dealt a crushing blow"). 17
See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 583-584 (1975).
18 "The sad truth is
that many classrooms across the country are not temples of learning
teaching the lessons of good will, civility, and wisdom that are
central to the fabric of American life. To the contrary, many
schools are in such a state of disorder that not only is the educational
atmosphere polluted, but the very safety of students and teachers
is imperiled." Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 23.
See also Brief for National Education Association as Amicus Curiae
21 ("If a suspected violation of a rule threatens to disrupt
the school or threatens to harm students, school officials should
be free to search for evidence of it").
19 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S.
1, 29 (1968); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S., at 881-882.
20 Throughout the criminal
law this dichotomy has been expressed by classifying crimes as
misdemeanors or felonies, malum prohibitum or malum in se, crimes
that do not involve moral turpitude or those that do, and major
or petty offenses. See generally W. LaFave, Handbook on Criminal
Law § 6 (1972).
Some codes of student behavior also provide a system of graduated
response by distinguishing between violent, unlawful, or seriously
disruptive conduct, and conduct that will only warrant serious
sanctions when the student engages in repetitive offenses. See,
e. g., Parent-Student Handbook of Piscataway [N. J.] H. S. (1979),
Record Doc. S-1, pp. 15-16; Student Handbook of South Windsor
[Conn.] H. S. para. E (1984); Rules of the Board of Education
of the District of Columbia, Ch. IV, §§ 431.1-.10 (1982).
Indeed, at Piscataway High School a violation of smoking regulations
that is "[a] student's first offense will result in assignment
of up to three (3) days of after school classes concerning hazards
of smoking." Record Doc. S-1, supra, at 15.
21 In Goss v. Lopez, 419
U.S., at 582-583 (emphasis added), the Court noted that similar
considerations require some variance in the requirements of due
process in the school disciplinary context:
"[As] a general rule notice and hearing should precede removal
of the student from school. We agree . . . , however, that there
are recurring situations in which prior notice and hearing cannot
be insisted upon. Students whose presence poses a continuing danger
to persons or property or an ongoing threat of disrupting the
academic process may be immediately removed from school. In such
cases the necessary notice and rudimentary hearing should follow
as soon as practicable. . . ."
22 In McDonald police officers
made a warrantless search of the office of an illegal "numbers"
operation. Justice Jackson rejected the view that the search could
be supported by exigent circumstances:
"Even if one were to conclude that urgent circumstances might
justify a forced entry without a warrant, no such emergency was
present in this case. . . . Whether there is reasonable necessity
for a search without waiting to obtain a warrant certainly depends
somewhat upon the gravity of the offense thought to be in progress
as well as the hazards of the method of attempting to reach it.
. . . [The defendant's] criminal operation, while a shabby swindle
that the police are quite right in suppressing, was not one which
endangered life or limb or the peace and good order of the community.
. . ." 335 U.S., at 459-460.
23 While a policeman who
sees a person smoking in an elevator in violation of a city ordinance
may conduct a full-blown search for evidence of the smoking violation
in the unlikely event of a custodial arrest, United States v.
Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 236 (1973); Gustafson v. Florida, 414
U.S. 260, 265-266 (1973), it is more doubtful whether a search
of this kind would be reasonable if the officer only planned to
issue a citation to the offender and depart, see Robinson, 414
U.S., at 236, n. 6. In any case, the majority offers no rationale
supporting its conclusion that a student detained by school officials
for questioning, on reasonable suspicion that she has violated
a school rule, is entitled to no more protection under the Fourth
Amendment than a criminal suspect under custodial arrest.
24 One thing is clear under
any standard -- the shocking strip searches that are described
in some cases have no place in the schoolhouse. See Doe v. Renfrow,
631 F.2d 91, 92-93 (CA7 1980) ("It does not require a constitutional
scholar to conclude that a nude search of a 13-year-old child
is an invasion of constitutional rights of some magnitude"),
cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1022 (1981); Bellnier v. Lund, 438 F.Supp.
47 (NDNY 1977); People v. D., 34 N. Y. 2d 483, 315 N. E. 2d 466
(1974); M. J. v. State, 399 So. 2d 996 (Fla. App. 1981). To the
extent that deeply intrusive searches are ever reasonable outside
the custodial context, it surely must only be to prevent imminent,
and serious harm.
25 94 N. J., at 346, 463
A. 2d, at 941-942 (quoting State v. McKinnon, 88 Wash. 2d 75,
81, 558 P. 2d 781, 784 (1977)) (emphasis added).
26 94 N. J., at 347, 463
A. 2d, at 942 (emphasis added).
27 Ibid. The court added:
"Moreover, there were not reasonable grounds to believe that
the purse contained cigarettes, if they were the object of the
search. No one had furnished information to that effect to the
school official. He had, at best, a good hunch. No doubt good
hunches would unearth much more evidence of crime on the persons
of students and citizens as a whole. But more is required to sustain
a search." Id., at 347, 463 A. 2d, at 942-943.
It is this portion of the New Jersey Supreme Court's reasoning
-- a portion that was not necessary to its holding -- to which
this Court makes its principal response. See ante, at 345-346.
28 See Parent-Student Handbook
of Piscataway [N. J.] H. S. 15, 18 (1979), Record Doc. S-1. See
also Tr. of Mar. 31, 1980, Hearing 13-14.
29 See, e. g., Tarter v.
Raybuck, 742 F.2d 977 (CA6 1984) (search for marihuana); M. v.
Board of Education Ball-Chatham Community Unit School Dist. No.
5, 429 F.Supp. 288 (SD Ill. 1977) (drugs and large amount of money);
D. R. C. v. State, 646 P. 2d 252 (Alaska App. 1982) (stolen money);
In re W., 29 Cal. App. 3d 777, 105 Cal. Rptr. 775 (1973) (marihuana);
In re G., 11 Cal. App. 3d 1193, 90 Cal. Rptr. 361 (1970) (amphetamine
pills); In re Donaldson, 269 Cal. App. 2d 509, 75 Cal. Rptr. 220
(1969) (methedrine pills); State v. Baccino, 282 A. 2d 869 (Del.
Super. 1971) (drugs); State v. D. T. W., 425 So. 2d 1383 (Fla.
App. 1983) (drugs); In re J. A., 85 Ill. App. 3d 567, 406 N. E.
2d 958 (1980) (marihuana); People v. Ward, 62 Mich. App. 46, 233
N. W. 2d 180 (1975) (drug pills); Mercer v. State, 450 S. W. 2d
715 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970) (marihuana); State v. McKinnon, 88 Wash.
2d 75, 558 P. 2d 781 (1977) ("speed").
30 See, e. g., In re L. L.,
90 Wis. 2d 585, 280 N. W. 2d 343 (App. 1979) (search for knife
or razor blade); R. C. M. v. State, 660 S. W. 2d 552 (Tex. App.
1983) (student with bloodshot eyes wandering halls in violation
of school rule requiring students to remain in examination room
or at home during midterm examinations).
31 See, e. g., State v. Young,
234 Ga. 488, 216 S. E. 2d 586 (three students searched when they
made furtive gestures and displayed obvious consciousness of guilt),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1039 (1975); Doe v. State, 88 N. M. 347,
540 P. 2d 827 (1975) (student searched for pipe when a teacher
saw him using it to violate smoking regulations).
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