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JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court.
JUSTICE BRENNAN, with whom JUSTICE
MARSHALL and JUSTICE BLACKMUN join, dissenting.
Respondents, former high school students who were staff members of the school's newspaper, filed suit in Federal District Court against petitioners, the school district and school officials, alleging that respondents' First Amendment rights were violated by the deletion from a certain issue of the paper of two pages that included an article describing school students' experiences with pregnancy and another article discussing the impact of divorce on students at the school. The newspaper was written and edited by a journalism class, as part of the school's curriculum. Pursuant to the school's practice, the teacher in charge of the paper submitted page proofs to the school's principal, who objected to the pregnancy story because the pregnant students, although not named, might be identified from the text, and because he believed that the article's references to sexual activity and birth control were inappropriate for some of the younger students. The principal objected to the divorce article because the page proofs he was furnished identified by name (deleted by the teacher from the final version) a student who complained of her father's conduct, and the principal believed that the student's parents should have been given an opportunity to respond to the remarks or to consent to their publication. Believing that there was no time to make necessary changes in the articles if the paper was to be issued before the end of the school year, the principal directed that the pages on which they appeared be withheld from publication even though other, unobjectionable articles were included on such pages. The District Court held that no First Amendment violation had occurred. The Court of Appeals reversed.
Held: Respondents' First Amendment rights were not violated. Pp. 266-276.
(a) First Amendment rights of students in the public schools are not automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings, and must be applied in light of the special characteristics of the school environment. A school need not tolerate student speech that is inconsistent with its basic educational mission, even though the government could not censor similar speech outside the school. Pp. 266-267.
(b) The school newspaper here cannot be characterized as a forum for public expression. School facilities may be deemed to be public forums only if school authorities have by policy or by practice opened the facilities for indiscriminate use by the general public, or by some segment of the public, such as student organizations. If the facilities have instead been reserved for other intended purposes, communicative or otherwise, then no public forum has been created, and school officials may impose reasonable restrictions on the speech of students, teachers, and other members of the school community. The school officials in this case did not deviate from their policy that the newspaper's production was to be part of the educational curriculum and a regular classroom activity under the journalism teacher's control as to almost every aspect of publication. The officials did not evince any intent to open the paper's pages to indiscriminate use by its student reporters and editors, or by the student body generally. Accordingly, school officials were entitled to regulate the paper's contents in any reasonable manner. Pp. 267-270.
(c) The standard for determining when a school may punish student expression that happens to occur on school premises is not the standard for determining when a school may refuse to lend its name and resources to the dissemination of student expression. Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, distinguished. Educators do not offend the First Amendment by exercising editorial control over the style and content of student speech in school-sponsored expressive activities so long as their actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns. Pp. 270-273.
(d) The school principal acted reasonably in this case in requiring the deletion of the pregnancy article, the divorce article, and the other articles that were to appear on the same pages of the newspaper. Pp. 274-276.
JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case concerns the extent to which educators may exercise
editorial control over the contents of a high school newspaper
produced as part of the school's journalism curriculum.
I
Petitioners are the Hazelwood School District in St. Louis County,
Missouri; various school officials; Robert Eugene Reynolds, the
principal of Hazelwood East High School; and Howard Emerson, a
teacher in the school district. Respondents are three former Hazelwood
East students who were staff members of Spectrum, the school newspaper.
They contend that school officials violated their First Amendment
rights by deleting two pages of articles from the May 13, 1983,
issue of Spectrum.
Spectrum was written and edited by the Journalism II class at
Hazelwood East. The newspaper was published every three weeks
or so during the 1982-1983 school year. More than 4,500 copies
of the newspaper were distributed during that year to students,
school personnel, and members of the community.
The Board of Education allocated funds from its annual budget
for the printing of Spectrum. These funds were supplemented by
proceeds from sales of the newspaper. The printing expenses during
the 1982-1983 school year totaled $ 4,668.50; revenue from sales
was $ 1,166.84. The other costs associated with the newspaper
-- such as supplies, textbooks, and a portion of the journalism
teacher's salary -- were borne entirely by the Board.
The Journalism II course was taught by Robert Stergos for most
of the 1982-1983 academic year. Stergos left Hazelwood East to
take a job in private industry on April 29, 1983, when the May
13 edition of Spectrum was nearing completion, and petitioner
Emerson took his place as newspaper adviser for the remaining
weeks of the term.
The practice at Hazelwood East during the spring 1983 semester
was for the journalism teacher to submit page proofs of each Spectrum
issue to Principal Reynolds for his review prior to publication.
On May 10, Emerson delivered the proofs of the May 13 edition
to Reynolds, who objected to two of the articles scheduled to
appear in that edition. One of the stories described three Hazelwood
East students' experiences with pregnancy; the other discussed
the impact of divorce on students at the school.
Reynolds was concerned that, although the pregnancy story used
false names "to keep the identity of these girls a secret,"
the pregnant students still might be identifiable from the text.
He also believed that the article's references to sexual activity
and birth control were inappropriate for some of the younger students
at the school. In addition, Reynolds was concerned that a student
identified by name in the divorce story had complained that her
father "wasn't spending enough time with my mom, my sister
and I" prior to the divorce, "was always out of town
on business or out late playing cards with the guys," and
"always argued about everything" with her mother. App.
to Pet. for Cert. 38. Reynolds believed that the student's parents
should have been given an opportunity to respond to these remarks
or to consent to their publication.
He was unaware that Emerson had deleted the student's name from
the final version of the article.
Reynolds believed that there was no time to make the necessary
changes in the stories before the scheduled press run and that
the newspaper would not appear before the end of the school year
if printing were delayed to any significant extent. He concluded
that his only options under the circumstances were to publish
a four-page newspaper instead of the planned six-page newspaper,
eliminating the two pages on which the offending stories appeared,
or to publish no newspaper at all. Accordingly, he directed Emerson
to withhold from publication the two pages containing the stories
on pregnancy and divorce. 1
He informed his superiors of the decision, and they concurred.
Respondents subsequently commenced this action in the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri seeking a
declaration that their First Amendment rights had been violated,
injunctive relief, and monetary damages. After a bench trial,
the District Court denied an injunction, holding that no First
Amendment violation had occurred. 607 F. Supp. 1450 (1985).
The District Court concluded that school officials may impose
restraints on students' speech in activities that are "'an
integral part of the school's educational function'" -- including
the publication of a school-sponsored newspaper by a journalism
class -- so long as their decision has "'a substantial and
reasonable basis.'" Id., at 1466 (quoting Frasca v. Andrews,
463 F. Supp. 1043, 1052 (EDNY 1979)). The court found that Principal
Reynolds' concern that the pregnant students' anonymity would
be lost and their privacy invaded was "legitimate and reasonable,"
given "the small number of pregnant students at Hazelwood
East and several identifying characteristics that were disclosed
in the article." 607 F. Supp., at 1466. The court held that
Reynolds' action was also justified "to avoid the impression
that [the school] endorses the sexual norms of the subjects"
and to shield younger students from exposure to unsuitable material.
Ibid. The deletion of the article on divorce was seen by the court
as a reasonable response to the invasion of privacy concerns raised
by the named student's remarks. Because the article did not indicate
that the student's parents had been offered an opportunity to
respond to her allegations, said the court, there was cause for
"serious doubt that the article complied with the rules of
fairness which are standard in the field of journalism and which
were covered in the textbook used in the Journalism II class."
Id., at 1467. Furthermore, the court concluded that Reynolds was
justified in deleting two full pages of the newspaper, instead
of deleting only the pregnancy and divorce stories or requiring
that those stories be modified to address his concerns, based
on his "reasonable belief that he had to make an immediate
decision and that there was no time to make modifications to the
articles in question." Id., at 1466.
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed. 795 F. 2d
1368 (1986). The court held at the outset that Spectrum was not
only "a part of the school adopted curriculum," id.,
at 1373, but also a public forum, because the newspaper was "intended
to be and operated as a conduit for student viewpoint." Id.,
at 1372. The court then concluded that Spectrum's status as a
public forum precluded school officials from censoring its contents
except when "'necessary to avoid material and substantial
interference with school work or discipline . . . or the rights
of others.'" Id., at 1374 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Independent
Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969)).
The Court of Appeals found "no evidence in the record that
the principal could have reasonably forecast that the censored
articles or any materials in the censored articles would have
materially disrupted classwork or given rise to substantial disorder
in the school." 795 F. 2d, at 1375. School officials were
entitled to censor the articles on the ground that they invaded
the rights of others, according to the court, only if publication
of the articles could have resulted in tort liability to the school.
The court concluded that no tort action for libel or invasion
of privacy could have been maintained against the school by the
subjects of the two articles or by their families. Accordingly,
the court held that school officials had violated respondents'
First Amendment rights by deleting the two pages of the newspaper.
We granted certiorari, 479 U.S. 1053 (1987), and we now reverse.
II
Students in the public schools do not "shed their constitutional
rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate."
Tinker, supra, at 506. They cannot be punished merely for expressing
their personal views on the school premises -- whether "in
the cafeteria, or on the playing field, or on the campus during
the authorized hours," 393 U.S., at 512-513 -- unless school
authorities have reason to believe that such expression will "substantially
interfere with the work of the school or impinge upon the rights
of other students." Id., at 509.
We have nonetheless recognized that the First Amendment rights
of students in the public schools "are not automatically
coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings,"
Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986),
and must be "applied in light of the special characteristics
of the school environment." Tinker, supra, at 506; cf. New
Jersey v. T. L. O., 469 U.S. 325, 341-343 (1985). A school need
not tolerate student speech that is inconsistent with its "basic
educational mission," Fraser, supra, at 685, even though
the government could not censor similar speech outside the school.
Accordingly, we held in Fraser that a student could be disciplined
for having delivered a speech that was "sexually explicit"
but not legally obscene at an official school assembly, because
the school was entitled to "disassociate itself" from
the speech in a manner that would demonstrate to others that such
vulgarity is "wholly inconsistent with the 'fundamental values'
of public school education." 478 U.S., at 685-686. We thus
recognized that "[t]he determination of what manner of speech
in the classroom or in school assembly is inappropriate properly
rests with the school board," id., at 683, rather than with
the federal courts. It is in this context that respondents' First
Amendment claims must be considered.
A
We deal first with the question whether Spectrum may appropriately
be characterized as a forum for public expression. The public
schools do not possess all of the attributes of streets, parks,
and other traditional public forums that "time out of mind,
have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts
between citizens, and discussing public questions." Hague
v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939). Cf. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S.
263, 267-268, n. 5 (1981). Hence, school facilities may be deemed
to be public forums only if school authorities have "by policy
or by practice" opened those facilities "for indiscriminate
use by the general public," Perry Education Assn. v. Perry
Local Educators' Assn., 460 U.S. 37, 47 (1983), or by some segment
of the public, such as student organizations. Id., at 46, n. 7
(citing Widmar v. Vincent). If the facilities have instead been
reserved for other intended purposes, "communicative or otherwise,"
then no public forum has been created, and school officials may
impose reasonable restrictions on the speech of students, teachers,
and other members of the school community. 460 U.S., at 46, n.
7. "The government does not create a public forum by inaction
or by permitting limited discourse, but only by intentionally
opening a nontraditional forum for public discourse." Cornelius
v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund, Inc., 473 U.S.
788, 802 (1985).
The policy of school officials toward Spectrum was reflected in
Hazelwood School Board Policy 348.51 and the Hazelwood East Curriculum
Guide. Board Policy 348.51 provided that "[s]chool sponsored
publications are developed within the adopted curriculum and its
educational implications in regular classroom activities."
App. 22. The Hazelwood East Curriculum Guide described the Journalism
II course as a "laboratory situation in which the students
publish the school newspaper applying skills they have learned
in Journalism I." Id., at 11. The lessons that were to be
learned from the Journalism II course, according to the Curriculum
Guide, included development of journalistic skills under deadline
pressure, "the legal, moral, and ethical restrictions imposed
upon journalists within the school community," and "responsibility
and acceptance of criticism for articles of opinion." Ibid.
Journalism II was taught by a faculty member during regular class
hours. Students received grades and academic credit for their
performance in the course.
School officials did not deviate in practice from their policy
that production of Spectrum was to be part of the educational
curriculum and a "regular classroom activit[y]." The
District Court found that Robert Stergos, the journalism teacher
during most of the 1982-1983 school year, "both had the authority
to exercise and in fact exercised a great deal of control over
Spectrum." 607 F. Supp., at 1453. For example, Stergos selected
the editors of the newspaper, scheduled publication dates, decided
the number of pages for each issue, assigned story ideas to class
members, advised students on the development of their stories,
reviewed the use of quotations, edited stories, selected and edited
the letters to the editor, and dealt with the printing company.
Many of these decisions were made without consultation with the
Journalism II students. The District Court thus found it "clear
that Mr. Stergos was the final authority with respect to almost
every aspect of the production and publication of Spectrum, including
its content." Ibid.
Moreover, after each Spectrum issue had been finally approved
by Stergos or his successor, the issue still had to be reviewed
by Principal Reynolds prior to publication. Respondents' assertion
that they had believed that they could publish "practically
anything" in Spectrum was therefore dismissed by the District
Court as simply "not credible." Id., at 1456. These
factual findings are amply supported by the record, and were not
rejected as clearly erroneous by the Court of Appeals.
The evidence relied upon by the Court of Appeals in finding Spectrum
to be a public forum, see 795 F. 2d, at 1372-1373, is equivocal
at best. For example, Board Policy 348.51, which stated in part
that "[s]chool sponsored student publications will not restrict
free expression or diverse viewpoints within the rules of responsible
journalism," also stated that such publications were "developed
within the adopted curriculum and its educational implications."
App. 22. One might reasonably infer from the full text of Policy
348.51 that school officials retained ultimate control over what
constituted "responsible journalism" in a school-sponsored
newspaper. Although the Statement of Policy published in the September
14, 1982, issue of Spectrum declared that "Spectrum, as a
student-press publication, accepts all rights implied by the First
Amendment," this statement, understood in the context of
the paper's role in the school's curriculum, suggests at most
that the administration will not interfere with the students'
exercise of those First Amendment rights that attend the publication
of a school-sponsored newspaper. It does not reflect an intent
to expand those rights by converting a curricular newspaper into
a public forum. 2 Finally,
that students were permitted to exercise some authority over the
contents of Spectrum was fully consistent with the Curriculum
Guide objective of teaching the Journalism II students "leadership
responsibilities as issue and page editors." App. 11. A decision
to teach leadership skills in the context of a classroom activity
hardly implies a decision to relinquish school control over that
activity. In sum, the evidence relied upon by the Court of Appeals
fails to demonstrate the "clear intent to create a public
forum," Cornelius, 473 U.S., at 802, that existed in cases
in which we found public forums to have been created. See id.,
at 802-803 (citing Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S., at 267; Madison
School District v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 429
U.S. 167, 174, n. 6 (1976); Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad,
420 U.S. 546, 555 (1975)). School officials did not evince either
"by policy or by practice," Perry Education Assn., 460
U.S., at 47, any intent to open the pages of Spectrum to "indiscriminate
use," ibid., by its student reporters and editors, or by
the student body generally. Instead, they "reserve[d] the
forum for its intended purpos[e]," id., at 46, as a supervised
learning experience for journalism students. Accordingly, school
officials were entitled to regulate the contents of Spectrum in
any reasonable manner. Ibid. It is this standard, rather than
our decision in Tinker, that governs this case.
B
The question whether the First Amendment requires a school to
tolerate particular student speech -- the question that we addressed
in Tinker -- is different from the question whether the First
Amendment requires a school affirmatively to promote particular
student speech. The former question addresses educators' ability
to silence a student's personal expression that happens to occur
on the school premises. The latter question concerns educators'
authority over school-sponsored publications, theatrical productions,
and other expressive activities that students, parents, and members
of the public might reasonably perceive to bear the imprimatur
of the school. These activities may fairly be characterized as
part of the school curriculum, whether or not they occur in a
traditional classroom setting, so long as they are supervised
by faculty members and designed to impart particular knowledge
or skills to student participants and audiences. 3
Educators are entitled to exercise greater control over this second
form of student expression to assure that participants learn whatever
lessons the activity is designed to teach, that readers or listeners
are not exposed to material that may be inappropriate for their
level of maturity, and that the views of the individual speaker
are not erroneously attributed to the school. Hence, a school
may in its capacity as publisher of a school newspaper or producer
of a school play "disassociate itself," Fraser, 478
U.S., at 685, not only from speech that would "substantially
interfere with [its] work . . . or impinge upon the rights of
other students," Tinker, 393 U.S., at 509, but also from
speech that is, for example, ungrammatical, poorly written, inadequately
researched, biased or prejudiced, vulgar or profane, or unsuitable
for immature audiences. 4 A
school must be able to set high standards for the student speech
that is disseminated under its auspices -- standards that may
be higher than those demanded by some newspaper publishers or
theatrical producers in the "real" world -- and may
refuse to disseminate student speech that does not meet those
standards. In addition, a school must be able to take into account
the emotional maturity of the intended audience in determining
whether to disseminate student speech on potentially sensitive
topics, which might range from the existence of Santa Claus in
an elementary school setting to the particulars of teenage sexual
activity in a high school setting. A school must also retain the
authority to refuse to sponsor student speech that might reasonably
be perceived to advocate drug or alcohol use, irresponsible sex,
or conduct otherwise inconsistent with "the shared values
of a civilized social order," Fraser, supra, at 683, or to
associate the school with any position other than neutrality on
matters of political controversy. Otherwise, the schools would
be unduly constrained from fulfilling their role as "a principal
instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing
him for later professional training, and in helping him to adjust
normally to his environment." Brown v. Board of Education,
347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
Accordingly, we conclude that the standard articulated in Tinker
for determining when a school may punish student expression need
not also be the standard for determining when a school may refuse
to lend its name and resources to the dissemination of student
expression. 5 Instead, we hold
that educators do not offend the First Amendment by exercising
editorial control over the style and content of student speech
in school-sponsored expressive activities so long as their actions
are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns. 6
This standard is consistent with our oft-expressed view that the
education of the Nation's youth is primarily the responsibility
of parents, teachers, and state and local school officials, and
not of federal judges. See, e. g., Board of Education of Hendrick
Hudson Central School Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 208 (1982);
Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 326 (1975); Epperson v. Arkansas,
393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968). It is only when the decision to censor
a school-sponsored publication, theatrical production, or other
vehicle of student expression has no valid educational purpose
that the First Amendment is so "directly and sharply implicate[d],"
ibid., as to require judicial intervention to protect students'
constitutional rights. 7
III
We also conclude that Principal Reynolds acted reasonably in requiring
the deletion from the May 13 issue of Spectrum of the pregnancy
article, the divorce article, and the remaining articles that
were to appear on the same pages of the newspaper.
The initial paragraph of the pregnancy article declared that "[a]ll
names have been changed to keep the identity of these girls a
secret." The principal concluded that the students' anonymity
was not adequately protected, however, given the other identifying
information in the article and the small number of pregnant students
at the school. Indeed, a teacher at the school credibly testified
that she could positively identify at least one of the girls and
possibly all three. It is likely that many students at Hazelwood
East would have been at least as successful in identifying the
girls. Reynolds therefore could reasonably have feared that the
article violated whatever pledge of anonymity had been given to
the pregnant students. In addition, he could reasonably have been
concerned that the article was not sufficiently sensitive to the
privacy interests of the students' boyfriends and parents, who
were discussed in the article but who were given no opportunity
to consent to its publication or to offer a response. The article
did not contain graphic accounts of sexual activity. The girls
did comment in the article, however, concerning their sexual histories
and their use or nonuse of birth control. It was not unreasonable
for the principal to have concluded that such frank talk was inappropriate
in a school-sponsored publication distributed to 14-year-old freshmen
and presumably taken home to be read by students' even younger
brothers and sisters.
The student who was quoted by name in the version of the divorce
article seen by Principal Reynolds made comments sharply critical
of her father. The principal could reasonably have concluded that
an individual publicly identified as an inattentive parent --
indeed, as one who chose "playing cards with the guys"
over home and family -- was entitled to an opportunity to defend
himself as a matter of journalistic fairness. These concerns were
shared by both of Spectrum's faculty advisers for the 1982-1983
school year, who testified that they would not have allowed the
article to be printed without deletion of the student's name.
8
Principal Reynolds testified credibly at trial that, at the time
that he reviewed the proofs of the May 13 issue during an extended
telephone conversation with Emerson, he believed that there was
no time to make any changes in the articles, and that the newspaper
had to be printed immediately or not at all. It is true that Reynolds
did not verify whether the necessary modifications could still
have been made in the articles, and that Emerson did not volunteer
the information that printing could be delayed until the changes
were made. We nonetheless agree with the District Court that the
decision to excise the two pages containing the problematic articles
was reasonable given the particular circumstances of this case.
These circumstances included the very recent replacement of Stergos
by Emerson, who may not have been entirely familiar with Spectrum
editorial and production procedures, and the pressure felt by
Reynolds to make an immediate decision so that students would
not be deprived of the newspaper altogether.
In sum, we cannot reject as unreasonable Principal Reynolds' conclusion
that neither the pregnancy article nor the divorce article was
suitable for publication in Spectrum. Reynolds could reasonably
have concluded that the students who had written and edited these
articles had not sufficiently mastered those portions of the Journalism
II curriculum that pertained to the treatment of controversial
issues and personal attacks, the need to protect the privacy of
individuals whose most intimate concerns are to be revealed in
the newspaper, and "the legal, moral, and ethical restrictions
imposed upon journalists within [a] school community" that
includes adolescent subjects and readers. Finally, we conclude
that the principal's decision to delete two pages of Spectrum,
rather than to delete only the offending articles or to require
that they be modified, was reasonable under the circumstances
as he understood them. Accordingly, no violation of First Amendment
rights occurred. 9
The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit is
therefore
Reversed.
---- Begin EndNotes ----
1 The two pages deleted from
the newspaper also contained articles on teenage marriage, runaways,
and juvenile delinquents, as well as a general article on teenage
pregnancy. Reynolds testified that he had no objection to these
articles and that they were deleted only because they appeared
on the same pages as the two objectionable articles.
2 The Statement also cited
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S.
503 (1969), for the proposition that "[o]nly speech that
'materially and substantially interferes with the requirements
of appropriate discipline' can be found unacceptable and therefore
be prohibited." App. 26. This portion of the Statement does
not, of course, even accurately reflect our holding in Tinker.
Furthermore, the Statement nowhere expressly extended the Tinker
standard to the news and feature articles contained in a school-sponsored
newspaper. The dissent apparently finds as a fact that the Statement
was published annually in Spectrum; however, the District Court
was unable to conclude that the Statement appeared on more than
one occasion. In any event, even if the Statement says what the
dissent believes that it says, the evidence that school officials
never intended to designate Spectrum as a public forum remains
overwhelming.
3 The distinction that we draw
between speech that is sponsored by the school and speech that
is not is fully consistent with Papish v. University of Missouri
Board of Curators, 410 U.S. 667 (1973) (per curiam), which involved
an off-campus "underground" newspaper that school officials
merely had allowed to be sold on a state university campus.
4 The dissent perceives no
difference between the First Amendment analysis applied in Tinker
and that applied in Fraser. We disagree. The decision in Fraser
rested on the "vulgar," "lewd," and "plainly
offensive" character of a speech delivered at an official
school assembly rather than on any propensity of the speech to
"materially disrup[t] classwork or involv[e] substantial
disorder or invasion of the rights of others." 393 U.S.,
at 513. Indeed, the Fraser Court cited as "especially relevant"
a portion of Justice Black's dissenting opinion in Tinker "'disclaim[ing]
any purpose . . . to hold that the Federal Constitution compels
the teachers, parents, and elected school officials to surrender
control of the American public school system to public school
students.'" 478 U.S., at 686 (quoting 393 U.S., at 526).
Of course, Justice Black's observations are equally relevant to
the instant case.
5 We therefore need not decide
whether the Court of Appeals correctly construed Tinker as precluding
school officials from censoring student speech to avoid "invasion
of the rights of others," 393 U.S., at 513, except where
that speech could result in tort liability to the school.
6 We reject respondents' suggestion
that school officials be permitted to exercise prepublication
control over school-sponsored publications only pursuant to specific
written regulations. To require such regulations in the context
of a curricular activity could unduly constrain the ability of
educators to educate. We need not now decide whether such regulations
are required before school officials may censor publications not
sponsored by the school that students seek to distribute on school
grounds. See Baughman v. Freienmuth, 478 F. 2d 1345 (CA4 1973);
Shanley v. Northeast Independent School Dist., Bexar Cty., Tex.,
462 F. 2d 960 (CA5 1972); Eisner v. Stamford Board of Education,
440 F. 2d 803 (CA2 1971).
7 A number of lower federal
courts have similarly recognized that educators' decisions with
regard to the content of school-sponsored newspapers, dramatic
productions, and other expressive activities are entitled to substantial
deference. See, e. g., Nicholson v. Board of Education, Torrance
Unified School Dist., 682 F. 2d 858 (CA9 1982); Seyfried v. Walton,
668 F. 2d 214 (CA3 1981); Trachtman v. Anker, 563 F. 2d 512 (CA2
1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 925 (1978); Frasca v. Andrews, 463
F. Supp. 1043 (EDNY 1979). We need not now decide whether the
same degree of deference is appropriate with respect to school-sponsored
expressive activities at the college and university level.
8 The reasonableness of Principal
Reynolds' concerns about the two articles was further substantiated
by the trial testimony of Martin Duggan, a former editorial page
editor of the St. Louis Globe Democrat and a former college journalism
instructor and newspaper adviser. Duggan testified that the divorce
story did not meet journalistic standards of fairness and balance
because the father was not given an opportunity to respond, and
that the pregnancy story was not appropriate for publication in
a high school newspaper because it was unduly intrusive into the
privacy of the girls, their parents, and their boyfriends. The
District Court found Duggan to be "an objective and independent
witness" whose testimony was entitled to significant weight.
607 F. Supp. 1450, 1461 (ED Mo. 1985).
9 It is likely that the approach
urged by the dissent would as a practical matter have far more
deleterious consequences for the student press than does the approach
that we adopt today. The dissent correctly acknowledges "[t]he
State's prerogative to dissolve the student newspaper entirely."
Post, at 287. It is likely that many public schools would do just
that rather than open their newspapers to all student expression
that does not threaten "materia[l] disrup[tion of] classwork"
or violation of "rights that are protected by law,"
post, at 289, regardless of how sexually explicit, racially intemperate,
or personally insulting that expression otherwise might be.
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