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ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE PHILIPPINE
ISLANDS
MR. JUSTICE DAY delivered the opinion of the court.
MR. JUSTICE PECKHAM, concurring and MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, dissenting
While it is settled that the Constitution of the United States is the only source of power authorizing action by any branch of the Federal Government, it is equally well settled that the United States may acquire territory in the exercise of the treaty-making power by direct cession as the result of war, and in making effective terms of peace and for that purpose has the powers of other sovereign nations.
Congress has the right to make laws for the government of Territories, without being subject to all the restrictions which are imposed upon it when passing laws for the United States considered as a political body of States in union and, until territory ceded by treaty has been incorporated into the United States, it is to be governed under Congress subject only to such constitutional restrictions upon its powers as are applicable to the situation.
It is evident, from Article IX of the treaty with Spain ceding the Philippine Islands, that the intention of the framers of the treaty was to reserve to Congress, so far as it could constitutionally be done, a free hand in dealing with the territory ceded by the treaty.
Congress has not up to the present time incorporated the Philippine Islands into the United States, and by an express provision of the act of July 1, 1902, § 1891, Rev. Stat., by which force and effect is given to the Constitution and laws of the United States in the Territories, does not apply to the Philippine Islands.
The power to govern territory implied in the right to acquire it, and given to Congress in Article IV, § 3 of the Constitution, to whatever other limitations it may be subject, does not require Congress to exact for ceded territory, not made a part of the United States by Congressional action, a system of laws which shall include the right of trial by jury, and the Constitution does not, without legislation and of its own force, carry such right to territory so situated.
Under §§ 7 and 8 of the libel law enacted by the Philippine Commission, permitting a fair and true report of judicial, legislative and public official proceedings as privileged communications but excluding libelous remarks or comments from the privilege, the headlines "Traitor, Seducer, Perjurer -- Wife would have killed him," over the report of a trial, although in quotation marks, are not within the privilege given by the act, and, if proved to be without basis, are libelous.
The power of Congress to authorize the temporary government, such as that established under the Spooner Resolution of March 2, 1901, for the Philippine Islands, has been frequently exercised and is not now open to question, and the Philippine Commission established under that act had power to enact the libel law involved in this case.
THE facts, which involved the question whether
in the absence of a statute of Congress expressly conferring the
right of trial by jury, when demanded by the accused, is a necessary
incident of judicial procedure in the Philippine Islands, are
stated in the opinion of the court.
COUNSEL: No brief filed for plaintiff in error.
Mr. L. R. Wilfley, Attorney General for the Philippine Islands
and Mr. Solicitor General Hoyt, for the United States. 1
JUDGES: Fuller, Harlan, Brewer, Brown, White,
Peckham, McKenna, Holmes, Day
MR. JUSTICE DAY delivered the opinion of the
court.
This case presents the question whether, in
the absence of a statute of Congress expressly conferring the
right, trial by jury is a necessary incident of judicial procedure
in the Philippine Islands, where demand for trial by that method
has been made by the accused and denied by the courts established
in the islands.
The recent consideration by this court and
the full discussion had in the opinions delivered in the so-called
"Insular cases," renders superfluous any attempt to
reconsider the constitutional relation of the powers of the government
to territory acquired by a treaty cession to the United States.
De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1; Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244.
The opinions rendered in those cases cover every phase of the
question, either legal or historical, and it would be useless
to undertake to add to the elaborate consideration of the subject
had therein. In the still more recent case of Hawaii v. Mankichi,
190 U.S. 197, the right to a jury trial in outlying territory
of the United States was under consideration. For the present
purpose it is only necessary to state certain conclusions which
are deemed to be established by prior adjudications, and are decisive
of this case.
It may be regarded as settled that the Constitution
of the United States is the only source of power authorizing action
by any branch of the Federal Government. "The Government
of the United States was born of the Constitution, and all powers
which it enjoys or may exercise must be either derived expressly
or by implication from that instrument." Downes v. Bidwell,
182 U.S. 244, 288, and cases cited. It is equally well settled
that the United States may acquire territory in the exercise of
the treaty-making power by direct cession as the result of war,
and in making effectual the terms of peace; and for that purpose
has the powers of other sovereign nations. This principle has
been recognized by this court from its earliest decisions. The
convention which framed the Constitution of the United States,
in view of the territory already possessed and the possibility
of acquiring more, inserted in that instrument, in article IV,
section 3, a grant of express power to Congress "to dispose
of and make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory
or other property belonging to the United States."
As early as the February term, 1810, of this
court, in the case of Sere and Laralde v. Pitot and others, 6
Cranch, 332, Chief Justice Marshall, delivering the opinion of
the court, said:
"The power of governing and legislating
for a territory is the inevitable consequence of the right to
acquire and to hold territory. Could this position be contested,
the Constitution of the United States declares that 'Congress
shall have power to dispose of and make all needful rules and
regulations respecting the territory or other property belonging
to the United States.' Accordingly we find Congress possessing
and exercising the absolute and undisputed power of governing
and legislating for the Territory of Orleans. Congress has given
them a legislative, an executive and a judiciary, with such powers
as it has been their will to assign to those departments respectively."
And later, the same eminent judge, delivering
the opinion of the court in the leading case upon the subject,
American Insurance Co. v. Canter, 1 Pet. 511, 542, says:
"The Constitution confers absolutely on
the government of the Union the powers of making war and of making
treaties; consequently that government possesses the power of
acquiring territory, either by conquest or by treaty. The usage
of the word is, if a nation be not entirely subdued, to consider
the holding of conquered territory as a mere military occupation,
until its fate shall be determined at the treaty of peace. If
it be ceded by the treaty, the acquisition is confirmed, and the
ceded territory becomes a part of the nation to which it is annexed,
either on the terms stipulated in the treaty of cession, or on
such as its new master shall impose. On such transfer of territory
it has never been held that the relations of the inhabitants with
each other undergo any change. Their relations with their former
sovereign are dissolved and new relations are created between
them and the government which has acquired their territory. The
same act which transfers their country transfers the allegiance
of those who remain in it; and the law, which may be denominated
political, is necessarily changed, although that which regulates
the intercourse and general conduct of individuals remains in
force until altered by the newly created power of the State.
" On the 2d of February, 1819, Spain ceded Florida to the United States. The sixth article of the treaty of cession contains the following provision: 'The inhabitants of the territories, which his Catholic Majesty cedes to the United States by this treaty, shall be incorporated in the Union of the United States as soon as may be consistent with the principles of the Federal Constitution, and admitted to the enjoyment of the privileges, rights and immunities of the citizens of the United States.'
"This treaty is the law of the land, and
admits the inhabitants of Florida to the enjoyment of the privileges,
rights and immunities of the citizens of the United States. It
is unnecessary to inquire whether this is not their condition,
independent of stipulation. They do not, however, participate
in political power; they do not share in the government till Florida
shall become a State. In the meantime Florida continues to be
a territory of the United States, governed by virtue of that clause
in the Constitution which empowers Congress 'to make all needful
rules and regulations respecting the territory or other property
belonging to the United States.'"
While these cases, and others which are cited
in the late case of Downes v. Bidwell, supra, sustain the right
of Congress to make laws for the government of territories, without
being subject to all the restrictions which are imposed upon that
body when passing laws for the United States, considered as a
political body of States in union, the exercise of the power expressly
granted to govern the territories is not without limitations.
Speaking of this power, Mr. Justice Curtis, in the case of Scott
v. Sandford, 19 How. 393, 614, said:
"If, then, this clause does contain a
power to legislate respecting the territory, what are the limits
of that power?
"To this I answer that, in common with
all the other legislative powers of Congress, it finds limits
in the express prohibitions on Congress not to do certain things;
that, in the exercise of the legislative power, Congress cannot
pass an ex post facto law or bill of attainder; and so in respect
to each of the other prohibitions contained in the Constitution."
In every case where Congress undertakes to
legislate in the exercise of the power conferred by the Constitution,
the question may arise as to how far the exercise of the power
is limited by the "prohibitions" of that instrument.
The limitations which are to be applied in any given case involving
territorial government must depend upon the relation of the particular
territory to the United States, concerning which Congress is exercising
the power conferred by the Constitution. That the United States
may have territory, which is not incorporated into the United
States as a body politic, we think was recognized by the framers
of the Constitution in enacting the article already considered,
giving power over the territories, and is sanctioned by the opinions
of the justices concurring in the judgment in Downes v. Bidwell,
supra.
Until Congress shall see fit to incorporate
territory ceded by treaty into the United States, we regard it
as settled by that decision that the territory is to be governed
under the power existing in Congress to make laws for such territories
and subject to such constitutional restrictions upon the powers
of that body as are applicable to the situation.
For this case, the practical question is, must
Congress, in establishing a system for trial of crimes and offenses
committed in the Philippine Islands, carry to their people by
proper affirmative legislation a system of trial by jury?
If the treaty-making power could incorporate
territory into the United States without Congressional action,
it is apparent that the treaty with Spain, ceding the Philippines
to the United States, carefully refrained from so doing; for it
is expressly provided that (Article IX) "the civil rights
and political status of the native inhabitants of the territories
hereby ceded to the United States shall be determined by the Congress."
In this language it is clear that it was the intention of the
framers of the treaty to reserve to Congress, so far as it could
be constitutionally done, a free hand in dealing with these newly-acquired
possessions.
The legislation upon the subject shows that
not only has Congress hitherto refrained from incorporating the
Philippines into the United States, but in the act of 1902, providing
for temporary civil government, 32 Stat. 691, there is express
provision that section eighteen hundred and ninety-one of the
Revised Statutes of 1878 shall not apply to the Philippine Islands.
This is the section giving force and effect to the Constitution
and laws of the United States, not locally inapplicable, within
all the organized territories, and every territory thereafter
organized, as elsewhere within the United States.
The requirements of the Constitution as to
a jury are found in article III, section 2:
"The trial of all crimes, except in cases
of impeachment, shall be by jury; and such trial shall be held
in the States where such crimes shall have been committed; but
when not committed within any State, the trial shall be at such
place or places as the Congress may by law have directed."
And in article six of the amendments to the
Constitution:
"In all criminal prosecutions the accused
shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial
jury, of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been
committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained
by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation;
to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the
assistance of counsel for his defence."
It was said in the Mankichi case, supra, that
when the territory had not been incorporated into the United States
these requirements were not limitations upon the power of Congress
in providing a government for territory in execution of the powers
conferred upon Congress. Opinion of Mr. Justice White, p. 220,
citing Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516; In re Ross, 140 U.S.
453, 473; Bolln v. Nebraska, 176 U.S. 83, and cases cited on page
86; Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581, 584; Downes v. Bidwell, 182
U.S. 244.
In the same case Mr. Justice Brown, in the
course of his opinion, said:
"We would even go farther, and say that most, if not all, the privileges and immunities contained in the bill of rights of the Constitution were intended to apply from the moment of annexation; but we place our decision of this case upon the ground that the two rights alleged to be violated in this case [right to trial by jury and presentment by grand jury] are not fundamental in their nature, but concern merely a method of procedure which sixty years of practice had shown to be suited to the conditions of the islands, and well calculated to conserve the rights of their citizens to their lives, their property and their well being."
As we have had occasion to see in the case
of Kepner v. United States, decided, ante, p. 100, the President,
in his instructions to the Philippine Commission, while impressing
the necessity of carrying into the new government the guarantees
of the Bill of Rights securing those safeguards to life and liberty
which are deemed essential to our government, was careful to reserve
the right to trial by jury, which was doubtless due to the fact
that the civilized portion of the islands had a system of jurisprudence
founded upon the civil law, and the uncivilized parts of the archipelago
were wholly unfitted to exercise the right of trial by jury. The
Spanish system, in force in the Philippines, gave the right to
the accused to be tried before judges, who acted in effect as
a court of inquiry and whose judgments were not final until passed
in review before the audiencia or Supreme Court, with right of
final review and power to grant a new trial for errors of law
in the Supreme Court at Madrid. To this system the Philippine
Commission, in executing the power conferred by the orders of
the President and sanctioned by act of Congress, act of July 1,
1902, 32 Stat. 691, has added a guaranty of the right of the accused
to be heard by himself and counsel, to demand the nature and cause
of the accusation against him, to have a speedy and public trial,
to meet the witnesses against him face to face, and to have compulsory
process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his behalf. And,
further, that no person shall be held to answer for a criminal
offense without due process of law, nor be put twice in jeopardy
of punishment for the same offense, nor be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself. As appears in the Kepner
case, supra, the accused is given the right of appeal from the
judgment of the court of first instance to the Supreme Court,
and, in capital cases, the case goes to the latter court without
appeal. It cannot be successfully maintained that this system
does not give an adequate and efficient method of protecting the
rights of the accused as well as executing the criminal law by
judicial proceedings, which give full opportunity to be heard
by competent tribunals before judgment can be pronounced. Of course,
it is a complete answer to this suggestion to say, if such be
the fact, that the constitutional requirements as to a jury trial,
either of their own force or as limitations upon the power of
Congress in setting up a government, must control in all the territory,
whether incorporated or not, of the United States. But is this
a reasonable interpretation of the power conferred upon Congress
to make rules and regulations for the territories?
The cases cited have firmly established the
power of the United States, like other sovereign nations, to acquire,
by the methods known to civilized people, additional territory.
The framers of the Constitution, recognizing the possibility of
future extension by acquiring territory outside the States, did
not leave to implication alone the power to govern and control
territory owned or to be acquired, but in the article quoted expressly
conferred the needful powers to make regulations. Regulations
in this sense must mean laws, for, as well as States, territories
must be governed by laws. The limitations of this power were suggested
by Mr. Justice Curtis in the Dred Scott case, above quoted, and
Mr. Justice Bradley, in the Mormon Church Case, 136 U.S. 1, said:
"Doubtless Congress in legislating for the Territories would be subject to those fundamental limitations in favor of personal rights which are formulated in the Constitution and its amendments; but these limitations would exist rather by inference and the general spirit of the Constitution from which Congress derives all its powers, than by any express and direct application of its provisions."
This language was quoted with approbation by
Mr. Justice Brown in Downes v. Bidwell, supra, and in the same
case Mr. Justice White said:
"Whilst, therefore, there is no express
or implied limitation on Congress in exercising its power to create
local governments for any and all of the Territories, by which
that body is restrained from the widest latitude of discretion,
it does not follow that there may not be inherent, although unexpressed,
principles which are the basis of all free government which cannot
be with impunity transcended. But this does not suggest that every
express limitation of the Constitution which is applicable has
not force, but only signifies that even in cases where there is
no direct command of the Constitution which applies, there may
nevertheless be restrictions of so fundamental a nature that they
cannot be transgressed, although not expressed in so many words
in the Constitution."
In treating of article 4, section 3, Judge
Cooley, in his work on Constitutional Law, says:
"The peculiar wording of the provision
[section 3, article 4] has led some persons to suppose that it
was intended Congress should exercise, in respect to the territory,
the rights only of a proprietor of property, and that the people
of the territories were to be left at liberty to institute governments
for themselves. It is no doubt most consistent with the general
theory of republican institutions that the people everywhere should
be allowed self-government; but it has never been deemed a matter
of right that a local community should be suffered to lay the
foundations of institutions, and erect a structure of government
thereon, without the guidance and restraint of a superior authority.
Even in the older States, where society is most homogeneous and
has fewest of the elements of disquiet and disorder, the State
reserves to itself the right to shape municipal institutions;
and towns and cities are only formed under its directions, and
according to the rules and within the limits the State prescribes.
With still less reason could the settlers in new territories be
suffered to exercise sovereign powers. The practice of the Government,
originating before the adoption of the Constitution, has been
for Congress to establish governments for the territories; and
whether the jurisdiction over the district has been acquired by
grant from the States, or by treaty with a foreign power, Congress
has unquestionably full power to govern it, and the people, except
as Congress shall provide for, are not of right entitled to participate
in political authority, until the Territory becomes a State. Meantime
they are in a condition of temporary pupilage and dependence;
and while Congress will be expected to recognize the principle
of self-government to such extent as may seem wise, its discretion
alone can constitute the measure by which the participation of
the people can be determined." Cooley, Principles of Constitutional
Law, 164.
If the right to trial by jury were a fundamental
right which goes wherever the jurisdiction of the United States
extends, or if Congress, in framing laws for outlying territory
belonging to the United States, was obliged to establish that
system by affirmative legislation, it would follow that, no matter
what the needs or capacities of the people, trial by jury, and
in no other way, must be forthwith established, although the result
may be to work injustice and provoke disturbance rather than to
aid the orderly administration of justice. If the United States,
impelled by its duty or advantage, shall acquire territory peopled
by savages, and of which it may dispose or not hold for ultimate
admission to Statehood, if this doctrine is sound, it must establish
there the trial by jury. To state such a proposition demonstrates
the impossibility for carrying it into practice. Again, if the
United States shall acquire by treaty the cession of territory
having an established system of jurisprudence, where jury trials
are unknown, but a method of fair and orderly trial prevails under
an acceptable and long-established code, the preference of the
people must be disregarded, their established customs ignored
and they themselves coerced to accept, in advance of incorporation
into the United States, a system of trial unknown to them and
unsuited to their needs. We do not think it was intended, in giving
power to Congress to make regulations for the territories, to
hamper its exercise with this condition.
We conclude that the power to govern territory,
implied in the right to acquire it, and given to Congress in the
Constitution in Article IV, § 3, to whatever other limitations
it may be subject, the extent of which must be decided as questions
arise, does not require that body to enact for ceded territory,
not made a part of the United States by Congressional action,
a system of laws which shall include the right of trial by jury,
and that the Constitution does not, without legislation and of
its own force, carry such right to territory so situated.
Other assignments of error bring further questions
before the court which we will proceed to notice. The case was
a prosecution for libel brought at the instance of Don Benito
Legarda, a member of the Philippine Commission, against the plaintiffs
in error, Dorr and O'Brien, who were proprietors and editors of
a newspaper published in the city of Manila, known as the "Manila
Freedom." It appears that Legarda was the prosecuting witness
against one Valdez, editor of a certain Spanish newspaper called
the "Miau." At the time of the trial of Valdez, under
the Spanish law then in force in the islands, the truth could
not be given in defence in a prosecution for criminal libel. Notwithstanding
this fact, counsel for Valdez, in the form of an offer of proof,
read a paper in court, making certain statements with reference
to the libel charged tending to show the truth thereof. In what
purported to be a report of the proceeding, the Manila Freedom
printed an article containing the matter set forth in the offer
to prove, with headlines in large type, as follows:
"TRAITOR, SEDUCER, AND PERJURER.
SENSATIONAL ALLEGATIONS AGAINST COMMISSIONER
LEGARDA.
MADE OF RECORD AND READ IN ENGLISH -- SPANISH
READING WAIVED.
WIFE WOULD HAVE KILLED HIM.
LEGARDA PALE AND NERVOUS."
The prosecution of the plaintiffs in error was based upon the publication of these headlines, which were charged to be a false and malicious libel printed in the English language of and concerning Don Benito Legarda. At the time Valdez was tried, in which case the occurrence undertaken to be reported took place, the Spanish law was in force, denying the right to put in evidence the truth of the alleged libelous matter. At the time of the trial of the plaintiffs in error the Philippine Commission had passed Act No. 277, known as the libel law:
[No. 277.]
"AN ACT defining the law of libel and threats to publish a libel, making libel and threats to publish libel misdemeanors, giving a right of civil action therefor, and making obscene or indecent publications misdemeanors.
"By authority of the President of the United States, be it enacted by the United States Philippine Commission that:
SEC. 1. A libel is a malicious defamation, expressed either in writing, printing or by signs or pictures, or the like, or public theatrical exhibitions, tending to blacken the memory of one who is dead or to impeach the honesty, virtue or reputation or publish the alleged or natural defects of one who is alive, and thereby expose him to public hatred, contempt or ridicule.
* * *
"SEC. 4. In all criminal prosecutions for libel the truth may be given in evidence to the court, and if it appears to the court that the matter charged as libelous is true, and was published with good motives and for justifiable ends, the party shall be acquitted; otherwise he shall be convicted; but to establish this defence, not only must the truth of the matter so charged be proven, but also that it was published with good motives and for justifiable ends.
* * *
"SEC. 6. Every author, editor or proprietor of any book, newspaper or serial publication is chargeable with the publication of any words contained in any part of such book or number of each newspaper or serial as fully as if he were the author of the same.
"SEC. 7. No reporter, editor or proprietor of any newspaper is liable to any prosecution for a fair and true report of any judicial, legislative or other public official proceedings, or of any statement, speech, argument or debate in the course of the same, except upon proof of malice in making such report, which shall not be implied from the mere fact of publication.
"SEC. 8. Libelous remarks or comments connected with matter privileged by the last section receive no privilege by reason of being so connected.
* * *
"Enacted October 24, 1901."
The contention is that the publication is privileged
under sections 7 and 8, the claim being that the publication was
a fair and truthful report of judicial proceedings. Testimony
was introduced in the court below tending to show malice, and
there was no proof to support the truth of the charges in the
alleged libel, which were found to be without basis and wanton,
and as the findings of the two lower courts in a cause brought
in review here are not ordinarily disturbed, the case upon this
branch might rest upon that proposition. It is evident, however,
that the publication in question did not stop with a simple report
of the judicial proceedings. Indeed, the paper offered in evidence
could not have been received under the law then in force -- a
fact concerning which no comment was made in the report of the
proceedings. Furthermore, section 8 of the law, while permitting
as privileged a fair and truthful report of judicial proceedings,
except upon express proof of malice, does not make privileged
libelous remarks or comments in connection with the privileged
matter. The draftsman of the law evidently had in mind the law
of criminal libel in newspaper publications as it exists in this
country. The privilege extends to a full and correct report of
judicial proceedings without prejudicial comment. The rule is
nowhere better stated than by Judge Cooley in his work on Constitutional
Limitations, 7th ed. p. 637:
"It seems to be settled that a fair and
impartial account of judicial proceedings, which have not been
ex parte, but in the hearing of both parties, is generally speaking,
a justifiable publication. But it is said that if a party is to
be allowed to publish what passes in a court of justice, he must
publish the whole case, and not merely state the conclusion which
he himself draws from the evidence. A plea that the supposed libel
was, in substance, a true account and report of a trial has been
held bad; and a statement of the circumstances of a trial as from
counsel in the case has been held not privileged. The report must
also be strictly confined to the actual proceedings in court,
and must contain no defamatory observations or comments from any
quarter whatsoever, in addition to what forms strictly and properly
the legal proceedings."
Many cases are cited by the learned author
in support of this conclusion. In Hayes v. Press Co., Limited,127
Pa. St. 642, headlines stating "Hotel Proprietors Embarrassed,"
in giving an account of a judgment rendered in the suit of a bank
against the proprietors of a certain hotel, was held not privileged.
In Newell on Defamation, Libel and Slander, § 163, the author
says:
"The publisher must add nothing of his
own. He must not state his opinion of the conduct of the parties,
or impute motives therefor; he must not insinuate that a particular
witness committed perjury. That is not a report of what occurred;
it is simply his comment on what occurred, and to this no privilege
attaches. Often such comments may be justified on another ground
-- that they are fair and bona fide criticism on a matter of public
interest, and are therefore not libelous. But such observations,
to which quite different considerations apply, should not be mixed
up with the history of the case. Lord Campbell said: "If
any comments are made, they should not be made as part of the
report. The report should be confined to what takes place in court,
and the two things -- report and comment -- should be kept separate.'
And all sensational headings to reports should be avoided."
Thomas v. Croswell, 7 Johns. N.Y. 264.
These headlines were not privileged matter
at the common law, and were libelous remarks or comments if the
matter could be deemed otherwise privileged, within the meaning
of § 8 of the Philippine libel law. An inspection of them
would seem to be sufficient to demonstrate this fact. The complainant
was held up to the public where the paper circulated in striking
headlines as "Traitor, Seducer, Perjurer," and while
these words were quoted as well as the phrase "Wife would
have killed him," their publication in this manner was certainly
the equivalent to a remark or comment unnecessary to a fair and
truthful report of judicial proceedings, and likely to raise inferences
highly detrimental to the character and standing of the one concerning
whom they were printed and published.
Further error is assigned in that Act No. 277
of the laws of the Philippine Commission was not passed by competent
legal authority. The act was one of the laws of the Philippine
Commission, passed by that body by virtue of the authority given
the President under the so-called Spooner resolution of March
2, 1901. The right of Congress to authorize a temporary government
of this character is not open to question at this day. The power
has been frequently exercised and is too well settled to require
further discussion. De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1, 196.
Judgment affirmed.
---- Begin EndNotes ----
1 This case
was argued simultaneously with Kepner v. United States. For abstracts
of arguments, see ante, p. 100.
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